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1 
 
Thucydides offered a political language that is not necessarily 
available in our lexicons of politics.  Often his history is 
characterized as a realist or strictly empirical description of the 
Peloponnesian War.  Yet it also provides a tragic account of the 
wages of hubris.  This essay advances that reading, contending that 
Thucydides enhanced his telling of the tragedy by attending to 
moods of the Athenian polis.  Political moods are the changeable 
temper of a polity:  a vital factor to be harnessed or counteracted 
by political leaders.  The collective moods of citizens in the 
Athenian assembly loom large in Thucydides’ tale of the war.  
Moods, notably hubris and demoralization, also grip Athenian 
leaders of the war effort. 
 
 
2 
 
The very vocabulary of Thucydides treats moods of Athenians as 
crucial grounds for strategic speech and action.  His history 
features a series of internally inseparable concepts that encompass 
reasons and moods.  These terms do not observe later contrasts 
between calculations of rationality and considerations of 
sentiment.  They evidence how Thucydides stressed moods as 
grounds for strategic interventions.  Here I interpret in context 
four of these key terms – gnome, kataphronesis, elpis and 
epistamai– to show that Thucydides did not operate with a strict 
dichotomy between reason and mood.  To read these concepts 
carefully is to bring out the political lessons of Thucydides. 
 
 
3 
 
The historical significance of the Peloponnesian War and the text 
of Thucydides can scarcely be overestimated.  Athens, the great 
democratic polis, rose to imperial dominance in ancient Greece 
and became the apex of classical culture in the decades after its 
victory over the Persians at the beginning of the fifth century bce.  
Then its defeat in the Peloponnesian War signaled a decisive 
turning point for this polity and culture.  Thucydides’ history, long 
held to be a founding document in the discipline of history, is a 
powerful account of the causes of Athenian defeat.  Thucydides 
addressed the problems associated with the maintenance of a polis 
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that is simultaneously democratic and imperial.  The enduring 
significance of this theme should be apparent today.  Under 
Perikles, the Athenian polis followed a strategy of limited aims; 
after his death, it descended into vicious overreaching that led 
ultimately to demoralization. 
 
4 
 
Recent readers often take Thucydides to be a paragon of realism.  
He is the hard-nosed author of the Melian dialogue, where the 
strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must.  This 
Thucydides is an unsentimental, empirical historian of his day, 
devoted mainly to describing a great war.  But the Melian dialogue 
is prologue to the Sicilian campaign, the tragic episode of 
overextension of Athens and their destruction in the great battles 
with Syracuse, the main Sicilian polis, and their Peloponnesian 
allies.  Thucydides narrated the episode in highly dramatic style.  
The modern distinction between empirical-realist history and 
dramatic-tragic storytelling does not capture the full power of 
Thucydides’ account.1  If we read the Melian dialogue in 
connection with the Sicilian campaign, we might arrive at an 
interpretation directly opposed to realism:  While the strong 
believe they can do what they are able to do, they often misassess 
their circumstances, overreach, and come to suffer defeat as a 
result. 
 
 
5 
 
The Melian episode occurred in the summer of 416 bce.  The 
following winter, 416/415, the Athenians contemplated their grand 
expedition to Sicily.  In the beginning – in the very first sentence – 
of his account, Thucydides pointed out that they misestimated the 
size of the island, the number of its inhabitants, and therefore the 
enormity of the task they proposed to accomplish.  Estimations – 
and the moods of generals and citizen-soldiers that cloud or distort 
them – are a vital element in the tragic course of the war for 
Athens. 
 
 
6 
 
In a note to one of Nikias’ exhortations to Athenian soldiers in the 
Sicilian campaign, scholar-translator David Grene writes that:  
 
 
 
Nothing stands out clearer throughout Book vii than 
the necessity under which the Athenian generals stood 
of taking account of the morale of their men from 
moment to moment.  Even if this is true of any army 
at any time, the present case is extreme and its 
extremity proves the nature of the Athenian forces.  
These are citizens first and soldiers after. . . . Here 
these citizens-in-arms were far from home, frightened 
 
Glenn Perusek 44 Poroi, 3, 2, December, 2004 
and bewildered by the unexpected success of an 
enemy they had thought to defeat with little trouble.  
Consequently, from the first to last their commanders 
had to persuade them, like an election meeting, of the 
necessity of fighting bravely.2  
 
 
 
What Grene says for Book 7 is in fact a leading theme throughout 
Thucydides’ work.  The collective mood of the citizens of the 
Athenian assembly – or the troops of the Athenian armies and 
navies – is a vital factor in Thucydides’ description of the course of 
the war.  This mood was highly changeable, and political and 
military leaders at times take advantage of it for their own 
purposes.  At other times they counter or divert it, and sometimes 
they must acquiesce to it. 
 
 
7 
 
Francis Cornford contended that Thucydides’ original intention of 
providing a realistic description of the course of the war, as a 
manual of strategy, was ultimately overlaid with a dramatic 
account of the tragedy of Athens.  Thucydides could not escape the 
influence of his own cultural context.3  Cornford is right to 
emphasize the tragic and dramatic elements in Thucydides’ work, 
but these need not be seen as so fundamentally counter-posed to 
any realist, empirical, descriptive design.  There is indeed a strong 
strategic lesson in Thucydides’ story:  for politicians or statesmen, 
war leaders, and citizens alike.  Unbridled passions – 
overreaching, striving for more land, seeking conquest, and the full 
venting of violent revenge on enemies – will be unleashed in 
wartime.  Prudent leaders take care to moderate these tendencies 
in themselves, in their generals and soldiers, and in the citizenry. 
 
 
8 
 
These passions are aspects of moods, themselves vital elements in 
tragic drama.  All aspects of moods must be taken fully into 
consideration by strategic leaders.  Thucydides used a rich 
vocabulary to describe these moods, weaving it into his description 
of the decisions and actions of the war.  It is this rich, complex 
fabric of description and drama that imparts to Thucydides’ 
history its enduring quality.  He preferred fidelity to events to a 
purely artful rendering.  This led him to trace war events according 
to “what belongs to humankind,” particularly our struggles with 
tragic passions. 
 
 
 
 Prudent-Moderation (sophrosune)  
 
9 
 
Coming of age during the Peloponnesian War, Plato had hopes for 
correcting the ills of democracy.  These were disappointed by the  
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Thirty Tyrants, led by his uncle, Critias, who came to power briefly 
in 404.  After the war, the democracy ’s retribution against Plato’s 
teacher, Socrates, further cemented Plato’s disillusionment.  A 
sane moderation in politics, from any quarter, seemed beyond 
reach; so the young writer withdrew from public life.  The 
“madness of the majority” made the quiet pursuit of philosophy all 
the more appealing.4  This experience formed the backdrop for the 
rigidly idealistic theory of the state that Plato developed in the 
middle dialogues – most notably, of course, in the Republic. 
 
10 
 
Plato’s ideal state distinguishes sharply among three classes:  the 
guardians (phulakes), who pursue wisdom and provide good 
counsel; the auxiliary guardians, who make up the fighting force 
and feature the virtue of courage; and the ordinary citizens, who 
manifest moderation (sophrosune).  Statecraft and education 
instill this moderation.  The authority of the phulakes tempers the 
pleasures and desires of ordinary citizens, in two ways.  The 
phulakes act to moderate citizen desires; and ordinary citizens 
recognize their own place, to “do their own work.”  They do not 
meddle in affairs of state.  Sophrosune might be called the master 
virtue of the three.  It spreads throughout the polis, making all 
harmonious.  But justice – dikaiosune, indication, the “right way” 
– is a consequence of sophrosune; and single-minded dedication 
to “one’s own work” is its hallmark.5 
 
 
11 
 
Plato analogized the well-governed polis to the properly ordered 
individual soul, which also has three parts.  Strong arguments for 
Plato’s polis arise from the suitability of the model for individuals.  
The person governed by an excess of courage – by anger, rather 
than by wisdom – would be dangerous to himself and others, just 
as the person ruled by desire for pleasures – food, drink, sex – 
would be self-destructive and out of control.  That reason should 
command makes sense by comparison, but this has led some to 
class Plato as anti-emotional or at least coldly intellectual.6  Yet in 
Book 9 of the Republic, Plato makes it clear that each type of 
person, and each part of the soul, has its own pleasure and its own 
desire.  We can speak of the wisdom-loving, the honor-loving, and 
the acquisition-loving persons.  The soul of the warrior would be 
directed by the desire for honor or victory; the soul of the money- 
or food-loving person by the desire for acquisition.7 
 
 
12 
 
Providing a “magnificent defense of emotion,” the Symposium also 
suggests that Plato was far from coldly intellectual.  The key 
section of this dialogue has Socrates reporting the teaching of 
Diotima, a wise woman, who termed love a great intermediary that 
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interprets spirit.8  Ideally love leads from bodies to souls, from the 
world of the concrete to increasingly abstract and general things, 
and ultimately to the forms.  Loves draws us toward 
“contemplating the vast sea of beauty,” which is “absolute, 
separate, simple, and everlasting.”9  But this is the ideal; in 
practice, the dialogue concludes with such problems of love as 
misdirection and inappropriate infatuation.  It is Alkibiades, drunk 
and disorderly, who enters the dialogue and provides an object 
lesson in the dangers of desire.  Socrates has tried to instruct him; 
but as Alkibiades himself says, “when I leave his presence the love 
of popularity gets the better of me.”10  Alkibiades is jealous and 
self-centered.  He wants Socrates only for himself and is angered 
at the philosopher’s repeated rejection.  The thoughtful drinking 
party breaks up because of the same man central to the destruction 
of Athenians in the Sicilian expedition that Thucydides described 
at the conclusion of his work on the war. 
 
13 
 
The teaching of sophrosune, that hubristic overreaching gets 
punished, is a leading theme in Greek literature of the fifth 
century.  In Agamemnon by Aeschylus, Klytemnestra voices her 
concern that the sackers of Troy not disturb the shrines.  They 
must recognize the gods of conquered cities, they must not 
plunder.11  But they have already plundered, leaving them 
unprotected on their journey home.  In Prometheus Bound, 
Hermes accuses Prometheus of being struck mad 
(phrenoplekton).  Time has not taught him sophronein, to be 
moderately-prudent.12  His insolent overreaching is to give mortals 
fire and other skills from the heavens.  And in the Persians, the 
ghost of Darius laments his son’s ill-fated expedition across the sea 
against the Greeks.  The destruction of the Persian army is 
punishment for hubris and phronematon, wanton violence and 
godlessly overbearing pride.13   The Persians march through Hellas 
destroying sacred shrines; their sacrilege is repaid in suffering.  
These evil deeds merit the heaps of corpses that their armies 
become as a silent sign that man is mortal and should learn to curb 
his pride.  Their human failing is to despise their present fortune 
and instead to lust for more.  The gods punish such overbearing 
arrogance, huperkompos, overstepping of bounds; and they warn 
Xerxes to take a course of prudent moderation, sophrosune.14 
 
 
 
 
Perikles:  Strategic Boldness 
Coupled with Moderate War Aims  
 
14 
 
In the account of Thucydides, Perikles, the great Athenian general 
and political leader, establishes a standard for prudent and far-  
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seeing leadership.  In his first major speech, Perikles attends to the 
mood of Athens at the outset of the war.  Perikles begins by noting 
the changeability of the Athenians.  His resolution (spirit, 
viewpoint, gnome) is to yield nothing to the Peloponnesians, even 
though he recognizes the danger that Athens will be of one spirit 
(passion, orge) in the assembly but another in the war’s execution.  
As circumstances change, resolutions change (1.140). 
 
15 
 
In his initial material estimation, Perikles sees Sparta advantaged 
in single combat but without the funds for a longer war.  The 
Athenian fleet is a permanent or insuperable advantage, because it 
would take generations for Sparta to achieve the skill that Athens 
has been developing since even before the Persian invasion.  Yet 
this objective asymmetry – between the formidable land force of 
Sparta and the naval superiority of Athens – necessitates a 
willingness by Athens to sacrifice Attic territory, and to make up 
for lost supplies from its empire:  the islands and other holdings.  
“Dismissing all thought of our land and houses, we must vigilantly 
guard the sea and the city” (1.143.5).  Perikles warns the Athenians 
that they must not engage the Peloponnesian forces on land, for it 
will spell certain defeat.  Instead Athens must maintain its fleet, its 
link to the empire that is the source of its strength. 
 
 
16 
 
It is an incredibly bold plan, not least because it entails a move 
that will surprise Sparta:  the sacrifice of houses and land in the 
Attic countryside.  Perikles closes the strategic exposition with a 
rhetorical flourish.  “If I thought I could convince you,” he says, “I 
would suggest you go out and destroy the houses yourselves, to 
show the Spartans that their razing them will not force us to 
submit to them” (1.143.5).  Crucial for success, however, is the 
fortitude and moderation of Athens.  It must not seek to enlarge its 
empire.  The question of Sicily may well have been in Perikles’ 
mind.  Although the major invasion of Sicily did not occur until 
415, designs on Sicily existed long before the war’s outbreak.  
Plutarch wrote that, at least as early as 448, “many were already 
possessed by that fatal passion for Sicily which later was inflamed 
by Alkibiades and his friends.  Some dreamed even of Carthage 
and Etruria.”15  Yet Athens must firmly dedicate itself to Perikles’ 
plan.  Athenian alacrity itself will dampen the ardor of its enemies 
(1.144.3). 
 
 
 
 The War Begins (2.8-2.22)  
 
17 
 
Enthusiasm for the war is greatest at the beginning, especially 
among the young, who had no previous experience of war (2.8.1).   
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The favor of most of Hellas is with the Peloponnesian allies.  
(Thucydides used eunoia, good minds.)  This is because there is 
general indignation against the empire.  Many in it wish to escape, 
and others fear subjugation.  Once again, Perikles wishes to 
restrain Athens from seeking more.  Its empire has created a 
hostile spirit among the Greek peoples (2.8.4-5). 
 
18 
 
With such preparations and spirit (gnome), Athens rushes 
(hormento) into the war (2.9.1).  This sentence is especially 
important.  First, the use of gnome makes it difficult to 
differentiate feelings from mentalities.  It follows a discussion of 
moods in the Athenian and Peloponnesian polei, and it is informed 
by the sense of hostility that the rest of Greece feels toward the 
Athenian empire.  Just as Geist is hard to translate from German 
to English, because it means both mind and spirit, gnome 
encompasses feelings and judgments.  Associated with judgment 
or intelligence (1.140.1) as the gnome of Perikles, it also suggests 
inclination.  When Argos inclines toward Athens, the term is 
gnome (5.44).  At 6.45, when the Syracusans make a full 
commitment to defense, preparing with all diligence, their purpose 
is their gnome.  When the Spartans develop new aims, they have 
changed gnome (3.92.1).  And when Corinth calls for united 
opposition to Athenian power, the purpose word is gnome 
(1.122.2).  Second, the use of hormento seems to foreshadow 
tragedy:  under the sage leadership of Perikles, the zeal of the 
inexperienced young is a condition for rushing into the war. 
 
 
19 
 
Difficulties quickly challenge the military leadership of Athens.  
The boldness of Perikles’ plan – necessitating the abandonment of 
the countryside – is difficult for the Athenians to accept in practice 
(2.16.2).  Perikles had warned the Athenians that they must 
sacrifice the countryside and rely on the fleet.  They accept this in 
the assembly.  Yet he warned that the changeability of their gnome 
in the course of the war could be their downfall.  Trouble would 
ensue if they either lost resolve or sought expansion of the empire.  
Merely a year later, the Athenians see the first invasion of Attic 
territory as unendurable.  It is a grievous insult; and the young, 
especially, want to confront the invaders (2.21.2).  Excited 
dialogues in the street trump the counsels of Perikles.  They abuse 
him for refusing to lead the army out and blame him for public 
suffering.  Seeing anger and poor judgment in ascendance, 
Perikles refuses to call an assembly. 
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Athens after the 
Second Spartan Invasion (2.59-2.65)  
 
20 
 
A second invasion ravages the countryside, crowds the population 
inside the city walls, and contributes to an outbreak of plague.  
These hardships lead Athenians to lose resolve, change gnome 
(2.59.1).  The trouble identified by Perikles in his initial speech 
(1.140.1) has once again come to pass.  Gnome suggests the will of 
Athenians more than their intelligence.  It highlights their 
judgment in the sense that their misfortunes have led to a more 
fearful, fatalistic pessimism.  They have changed their minds, but 
more than that they have a new spirit or mood.  Holding Perikles 
responsible for their hardships, they are eager (hormento) to reach 
terms with Sparta.  Their despair is deep; their gnome is 
impassable, aporoi.  They see no way out. 
 
 
21 
 
Perikles calls an assembly to encourage them, to inspire them, to 
lead them from anger to calm and fearless resolution.  Perikles 
patiently explains to the Athenians that, even though they are 
thoroughly dismayed at the situation and hold him responsible, 
steadiness of purpose can lead them beyond present misfortunes.  
They are now in a weakened state of purpose (gnome), one that 
has turned against him in light of their misfortunes (2.61.2).  The 
biggest blow to Athens is the appearance of the unexpected, the 
plague.  The unexpected enslaves the spirit (phronema) (2.61.3).  
After calling on their public-spiritedness, their willingness to 
sacrifice for the commonwealth, Perikles encourages the Athenians 
by emphasizing their special excellence, their utter naval 
superiority.  In a striking phrase, Perikles calls on Athens to 
confront its enemies not merely with spirit but with arrogance or 
contempt (me phronemati alla kai kataphronemati) (2.62.3), 
which should spring from a recognition of Athenian naval 
superiority. 
 
 
22 
 
Why would Thucydides use such a negative term in the Perikles 
speech?  The contrast at 2.62.4 may be helpful:  “For pride 
(boasting, auchema) comes from ignorant good fortune and is 
available to any coward; while supremely confident arrogant 
contempt (kataphronesis), which comes from trusting knowledge 
of prevailing over our enemies, is our situation.”  Perikles is 
speaking to an audience disheartened, even panicked, by 
unexpected events.16  The contrast is between (empty) boasting 
and (justified) contempt of the enemy.  Naval superiority justifies 
the contempt.  An adequate sense of the situation is what 
differentiates trusting knowledge from ignorant good fortune.  Any 
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fool can boast; arrogance born of advantage is not empty 
posturing.  Perikles is telling the Athenians to believe that they will 
prevail because their naval superiority is a material fact. 
 
23 
 
The only other such use of kataphronesis in Thucydides is the 
speech by Hermokrates to the Syracusans (6.33-34).  At first, 
Hermokrates warns the Syracusans not to underestimate the 
danger of an Athenian invasion.  “Do not allow yourselves to be 
taken unguarded through contempt (kataphronesis), nor through 
disbelieving neglect the common good” (6.33.3).  At the end of his 
speech, after Hermokrates has called for an active defense, he says 
that contempt for the invader will be shown through the strength 
of deeds.  He contrasts this to the complacent talking down of the 
threat that had been occurring in the assembly.  Yet Hermokrates 
is unable to shake the Syracusans, who resist recognizing that 
contempt for the Athenian threat requires rapid preparation for 
war. 
 
 
24 
 
This positive use of kataphronesis in speeches by Perikles and by 
Hermokrates expresses hyperbole in the heat of an argument.  In 
both cases, “real” kataphronesis, based on knowledge of some 
strategic superiority, contrasts with empty boasting.  Perikles 
underlines for the Athenians their distinctive excellence, calling on 
them to be bold once more, even after their setbacks.  Here 
kataphronesis is a supreme confidence:  the mood of people sure 
of themselves in light of their powers and plans.  It is a mood 
secured by trust in knowledge, stepping outside the dichotomy 
between reason and emotion. 
 
 
25 
 
Persuaded, the Athenians do not send envoys of peace to Sparta.  
Poor and rich, despite their suffering, recover enthusiasm for war 
(polemon mallon hormento) (2.65.2).  But crowds are changeable:  
not until they fine Perikles does their passionate temperament 
(orge) toward him cease (2.65.3).  Soon, though, they turn around 
to elect him general again, entrusting affairs of the war to him. 
 
 
26 
 
Thucydides characterized the rule of Perikles as measured, 
metrios, summarizing the war policy of Perikles in a phrase:  “He 
said to wait quietly (hesuchazontas) and attend to the fleet and to 
take no new acquisitions in war, which would bring danger to the 
polis” (2.65.7).  It was an “unambitious” policy, a defensive policy 
of strictly limited objectives.  It sought to secure the imperial 
possessions Athens already had.  Yet the willingness to sacrifice 
the Attic countryside is a bold stroke in the midst of the policy.  
Thucydides admires this combination of vigorous action, 
 
Glenn Perusek 51 Poroi, 3, 2, December, 2004 
emphasized at 1.140, and moderate goals.  The statesmen after 
Perikles, in contrast, “managed affairs in the opposite way.  . . . In 
accordance with personal ambition and personal gain they 
pursued other policies that seemed unrelated to the war, to the 
detriment of both themselves and the allies, since, when these 
succeeded, they brought honor and benefit more to individuals 
but, when they failed, they did damage to the city regarding the 
war” (2.65.7, Lattimore). 
 
27 
 
Basing Athenian policy on naval superiority, Perikles tries to focus 
Athens on specific aims and tactics.  Those who come after him do 
the opposite:  goaded by love of individual glory and gain, they 
involve Athens in dangerous or spurious adventures.  They 
necessarily stumble, harming the polis.  Perikles, the first man of 
Athens, rules through reputation, judgment (gnome), and clear 
incorruptibility.  He need not pander to the assembly; he “rules 
instead of being ruled by” the masses.  Personal acquisition never 
interests him.   When the assembly needs to hear hard truths, he 
never shrinks from the responsibility.  His repute is so high that he 
can manage the passions (orgen) of the crowd (2.65.8).  Whenever 
he perceives the crowd to be arrogant, insolently over-confident 
(hubrei tharsountas), or otherwise outside due measure (para 
kairon), he shocks them into fear (kataplessen epi to 
phobeisthai).  Yet when they are unreasonably fearful, he restores 
them to courage (tharsein) (2.65.9).17 
 
 
28 
 
The preeminence of Perikles gives way to more equal, contentious 
antagonists for power.  Men stretch (oregomenoi) to become first.  
They pander to the assembly, deferring to the pleasure of the 
people (2.65.10).  Then the Athenians make mistakes, especially in 
sailing to Sicily, although Thucydides faulted bad estimations of 
Sicily less than imperial intrigues that diverted Athens and led to 
its downfall (2.65.11). 
 
 
 
 
Episodes of Overreaching: 
Mytilene, Pylos, and Melos  
 
29 
 
After the death of Perikles, overreaching leaders come to the fore 
in Athens.  Kleon and Alkibiades, in particular, are key figures in 
Thucydides’ drama of Athens as a democratic empire that falls into 
a madness of mood and policy. 
 
 
 
 Suppression of the Mytilene Revolt (3.35-3.50)  
 30  In 428-427, oligarchic leaders of Mytilene stage an ultimately  
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unsuccessful revolt against the Athenian empire.  Many among the 
Mytileneans oppose the anti-Athenian revolt.  Yet when the 
revolt’s leaders are delivered to Athens, the Athenians decide “in 
the fury of the moment” (hupo orge) to kill all the adult males of 
Mytilene and to enslave all its women and children (3.36.2).  But 
the next day, the Athenians recoil from this harsh penalty.  They 
quickly recognize their error and reconsider the savage decision 
(3.36.4).  The main advocate of the terrible penalty for Mytilene is 
Kleon, a popular demagogue and “the most violent man at Athens” 
(3.36.6). 
 
31 
 
In the history of Thucydides, Kleon speaks for the mood of 
Athenians in wishing to annihilate Mytilene.  As the assembly 
reconsiders its vote (3.37-40), Kleon attacks the assembly itself.  
He argues that democracy is incapable of the harsh actions 
required to maintain obedience in an empire.  Strength (ischui), 
rather than good will (eunoia) or friendly gestures (charizesthe), 
maintains the empire (3.37.2).  Particularly dangerous is 
indecision:  the unwillingness to stay with decisions.  Implacable 
force serves the imperial polis better than humane but toothless 
laws (3.37.3).  Blind discipline, in the empire and the assembly, is 
superior to cunning indiscipline.  Kleon calls for an unthinking 
obedience in the assembly and the empire.  Those who wish to 
reconsider the Mytilene punishment are sophistic.  They would 
distract the imperial polis from its purpose by having Athens 
proceed with its passion, its anger, blunted (3.38.1).  Temporizing, 
exercising conscience, seeking to get policy right:  Kleon condemns 
them all. 
 
 
32 
 
In a strikingly prophetic passage, Kleon himself condemns 
hubristic overreaching.  The Mytileneans had moved boldly.  With 
expectations (elpisates) greater than their powers, but not their 
ambitions, they had gone to war supposing that strength (ischun) 
is more worthy than right (dikaiou).  Customarily in wars, the 
most unexpected good fortune turns people to hubris (3.39.3-4).  
With these words of accusation against Mytilene, Kleon 
foreshadows his own overreaching (pleonekteo) – grasping for 
more than is deserved – after Athenian good fortune at Pylos.  His 
words also reach forward ironically to Athenian policy towards 
Melos.  Kleon calls on the empire to act rashly, passionately, and 
viciously; but when a small power does, it is arrogant.  Did 
Thucydides want us to read Kleon’s words as a condemnation of 
the arrogance of Athens in the Melian case?  Do Kleon’s words 
presage condemnation of the Athenian campaign in Sicily?  The 
Athenians proceeded with excessive hope, believing their own 
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strength sufficient reason to subdue far-off Sicily:  strength more 
worthy than right led to arrogant insolence.  The Athenian failure 
in Sicily is punishment for this arrogant overreaching. 
 
33 
 
Tapping a heated mood of vengeance, Kleon nearly persuades 
Athens to punish the Mytileneans excessively.  Provided by 
Thucydides, the response by Diodotos is calm and deliberative.  It 
just barely draws Athens back from the brink.  The two great 
enemies of good counsel, Diodotos begins, are haste (tachos) and 
anger (passion, orgen).  These bring senselessness (anoias), lack 
of control (apaideusias), and short or scant thought (brachutetos 
gnomes) (3.42.1).  Logos must inform action; only the ignorant or 
personally interested would maintain otherwise.  Contrary to 
Kleon, Diodotos emphasizes that his standard is not justice for 
Mytileneans but advantage for Athenians.  He concedes that 
Kleon’s speech accords with the present passion of Athens, but he 
says the assembly’s task is statecraft.  Extreme punishment will 
not deter potential rebels.  Cities in revolt against the empire will 
fight to the last if they know the punishment for failure is death.  
Like other polei, moreover, Mytilene is divided between popular 
and oligarchic elements.  What Kleon advocates, essentially, is 
butchering the people of Mytilene, “who had nothing to do with 
the revolt.”  Athens should encourage the favor and friendship of 
this class, not cut it off.  In the end, Athens returns to calm 
conscience, rescinding its harsh vote.  With Mytilene in 427, the 
madness, born of anger, is momentary.  With Melos in 416, it 
becomes the policy of Athens. 
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In an expansive section (3.45) of his speech, Diodotos dilates on 
the ubiquity of human striving.  Again this foreshadows the tragic 
fall of Athens in the Sicilian campaign.  He contends that passions 
are an incurable force, leading men into danger, whether they are 
poor or rich.  Wealth leads to insolent confidence and 
overreaching (hubrei ten pleonexian kai phronemati) (3.45.4).  
Expectation (elpis) abets orge by devising plans; desire (eros) by 
undergirding them with good fortune.18  What is it to expect?  In 
the positive, this Thucydides word encompasses an estimation of 
prospects from projecting current situations plus a mood of hope, 
optimism, or the like.  In the negative, it is a despairing or 
pessimistic anticipation of future events.  The judgment and the 
feeling proceed together, inseparably.  In expectation, moods 
inform calculations in part and emerge in part from them.  Thus 
expectation (elpis) is an internally inseparable concept that 
combines mood and calculation. 
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 From Pylos to Melos  
 
35 
 
Another important episode is the campaign at Pylos, on 
Peloponnesian territory.  Athens experiences unexpected good 
fortune in capturing it.  When reinforcements led by Kleon seize 
nearly three hundred hostages from Sparta and its allies, Athens is 
in a position to negotiate a favorable peace.  Thucydides suggests 
that this was a highly opportune moment to end the war and to 
strengthen the Athenian empire by securing an alliance with 
Sparta.  In the negotiations following Athens’ first victory at Pylos, 
Spartan envoys acknowledge the strong situation of their rivals, 
but warn that such good fortune is fleeting.  Athens rejects their 
offer of peace and alliance, and instead, under the influence of 
Kleon, grasp at more than is deserved, pleonos oregonto (4.21.2).  
A second battle is then fought at Pylos, which Thucydides 
described as the greatest anomaly of the entire war, as it resulted 
in victory for Kleon’s mad intransigence (4.39.3).  Once again 
Athens refuses to negotiate peace with Sparta; they are meizonton 
te oregonto, stretching out for more (4.41.4).  Were Athenian 
statesmen to observe Periklean limits, their first concern would be 
to secure the existing empire.  Goaded by a surprisingly successful 
Kleon, however, the assembly turns intransigent; and that mood 
dooms negotiations with Sparta. 
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In his speech on the eve of the first battle at Pylos (4.10), 
Demosthenes reverses the standard relation of hope (elpis) and 
purpose (gnome).  He asks the troops to shun the appearance of 
intelligence through calculating dangers; instead they should act in 
good hopes (euelpis) of prevailing.  Such critical moments call for 
resolute and rapid action, not calculation.  ‘Don’t think, but act,’ 
Demosthenes says in effect.  But even as he warns the soldiers 
against calculations, he demonstrates that he has made them to 
conclude that the situation confers a single, decisive advantage on 
the Athenians.  The Spartans are more numerous, but that won’t 
matter if the Athenians stand their ground, because the rocky 
terrain prevents access except in a few places.  Defending these 
chokepoints, the Athenians need not fear the numerical superiority 
of their opponent.19 
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Following the death of Kleon, new leaders come to the fore in 
Athens and Sparta.  A precarious peace prevails for some years.  By 
418, a new war leader, Alkibiades, denounces the treaty and upsets 
the peace.  The Athenian expedition to Melos signals the return to 
Kleon’s approach.  Initially colonists from Sparta, the Melians seek 
to stay outside the larger struggle; but the Athenians insist that the 
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Melians, like other islanders, submit to the Athenian empire.  
When Melians offer only a friendly neutrality, Athenians besiege 
the island polis.  The fifth book by Thucydides ends with all grown 
men on Melos put to death and all women and children sold into 
slavery.  Although a serene mood of calculation suffuses the 
Melian dialogue, the words and deeds of the Athenians betray a 
mad spirit of blindness and insolence.20  They calmly ridicule all 
Melian hope for the future. 
 
 
 The Sicilian Campaign  
 
38 
 
The immediate sequel to the ruthless obliteration of Melos is the 
Sicilian campaign; it bears the poison fruits of Athenian hubris.  
The first sentence suggests that the expedition arises from awful 
miscalculation.  The assembly is eager to subjugate Sicily, even 
though Athenians know little about the size of the island or the 
number of its inhabitants (6.1.1).  They undertake a war “not much 
inferior” to the one they waged against the Peloponnesians.  From 
the outset, Thucydides left no doubt that he considered the Sicilian 
campaign a fatal overreach for Athens. 
 
 
 
 Nikias before the Athenian Assembly (6.9-6.13)  
 
39 
 
To the assembly, Nikias speaks against the Sicilian campaign.  He 
acknowledges the assembly’s risk-taking sensibility but suggests 
that in this case the haste is untimely (oute en kairoi) (6.9.3).  
Nikias echoes Perikles.  Athens already has many enemies in 
Hellas; the Sicilian campaign would only augment its foes.  The 
treaty with Sparta is not secure.  Sending large parts of the 
Athenian fleet and hoplites to Sicily would make Athens 
vulnerable.  Hellenic polei would seize the opportunity to attack 
Athens if they find its power divided (6.10.4).  Campaigning in 
Sicily amounts to “grasping (oregesthai) at another empire before 
we have secured the one we have already” (6.10.5).  With the 
empire insecure at home, even a victory in Sicily would leave that 
island hard to govern.  It is “too far off and too numerous to be 
ruled without difficulty” (6.11.1).  
 
 
40 
 
Athens should instead hold its power as a threat – an unmade 
move – against Sicily.  “The Hellenes in Sicily would fear us most 
(ekpeplegmenoi) if we never went there at all” (6.11.4).  Athens is 
fortunate to be in its present situation; it is fortunate to have the 
victories that pave the way to a favorable peace.  The danger is to 
become overconfident (kataphronesantes) on the basis of this 
good fortune (6.11.5).  Nikias admits that his strategy is defensive.  
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He is more concerned to keep watch on the empire “at home” than 
to augment it abroad (6.11.7).  He worries that the young are 
possessed by a “fatal desire,” that they literally are “sick in love” 
(duserotas) with the far away.  He cautions that desire 
(epithumiai) attains little, foresight (pronoiai) much (6.13.1).  A 
“mad dream of conquest” produces this expedition; Athens is 
gravely endangered by it (6.13.1). 
 
 
 The Speech of Alkibiades  
 
41 
 
Thucydides characterized Alkibiades – the attractive, energetic, 
charismatic, profligate young leader – as personally ambitious.  He 
opposes Nikias in Athens but also seeks glory and wealth from 
destroying Sicily and Carthage (6.15.2).21  Alkibiades has passions 
(epithumiais) greater than his estate could support (6.15.3).   This 
results in the destruction (katheilen) of the Athenian polis.22  The 
many fear the greatness of Alkibiades’ transgressions 
(paranomias) in personal life, thinking them worthy of one who 
desires (epithumounti) tyranny. 
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Alkibiades says that his passion causes Sparta to fear him.  His 
orgei, his senselessness contrary to nature (anoia para phusin), 
his “credibility through ardor” as Lattimore has it, makes the 
Peloponnesians tremble before him.  Alkibiades suggests that the 
Sicilian polei are not strong opponents.  The peoples of Sicily are 
divided, selfish, and mobile:  no match for the well-equipped 
Athenians (6.17.4).  Athens can benefit from barbarian hostility to 
Syracuse.  Moreover the great strength of Athens, the navy, is the 
great weakness of Sparta, which cannot be expected to aid 
Syracuse.  The Athenian empire can be expanded, and Alkibiades 
argues this is imperative if the empire is to be kept.  If Athens 
remains inactive, and forms of hesuchon appear twice, at 6.18.2 
and 6.18.3, it is in danger of being subdued by others.  “We have 
reached a position in which we must not be content with retaining 
what we have but must scheme to extend it or, if we cease to rule 
others, we shall be in danger of being ruled ourselves” (6.18.3).  
Athens should show the Peloponnesians contempt (huperidontes) 
for the present peace (or “ease,” again a form of hesuchon). 
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In short, Alkibiades holds out the prospect of empire over the 
whole Greek world.  The bold stroke against Sicily would 
strengthen the empire, even at home.  It would “humble the pride” 
of the Peloponnesians and ruin the Syracusans.  At base, Athens 
could always count on its naval superiority.  The alternative is the 
“passive policy” of Nikias.   If Athens allows itself to “sink into 
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inaction” (apragmosunes), its skills would decay, and it could not 
defend itself.  “A city not inactive by nature could not choose a 
quicker way to ruin itself than by suddenly adopting such a policy” 
(6.18.7). 
 
 
 Nikias’ Second Speech  
 
44 
 
After hearing Alkibiades, along with representatives of the 
Egesteans and the Leontine exiles, the assembly “became more 
eager” (hormento) for the expedition.  Sensing the change of 
mood, Nikias alters tactics.  Now he would dissuade Athens by 
stressing the expedition’s need for costly preparations.  Nikias calls 
for the largest hoplite force possible plus “overwhelming 
superiority at sea.”  But his estimation of the expedition’s 
magnitude makes the assembly more avid than ever.  It does not 
hear his caution that even a well-armed invasion of Sicily is risky 
but believe instead that “the expedition would be the safest in the 
world.” 
 
 
 
 
Everyone fell in love with the enterprise.  The older 
men thought that they would either subdue the places 
against which they were to sail, or at all events, with 
so large a force, meet with no disaster; those in the 
prime of life felt a longing for foreign sights and 
spectacles, and had no doubt that they should come 
safe home again; while the idea of the common people 
and the soldiery was to earn wages at the moment, 
and make conquests that would supply a never-ending 
fund of pay for the future (6.24.3, Crawley). 
 
 
 
 
War fever grips Athens.  The few with reservations hold back, 
unwilling to appear “unpatriotic” to the enthusiastic, 
overwhelming majority.  
 
 
 Convinced Knowing (epistamai)  
 
45 
 
The knowledge word, epistamai, is the root for epistemology.  It 
translates into “scientific knowledge” in English and other modern 
languages.  Used abundantly by Homer, it refers both to 
intellectual power23  and artistic skill,24  as in the “dancer’s 
knowing (epistamenoisi) feet (Iliad 18.599).”  In the fifth century, 
epistamai connotes assurance or confidence.25  Urging Darius to 
war, Atossa argues (in the words of Herodotus at 3.134) that 
Darius is a great ruler but idle, so that the Persians need to know 
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(ekmathosi) they are ruled by a great man.  The benefit would be 
double:  not only will the Persians know (episteontai) Darius as a 
great man, but they also will be worn down by war and become 
less of a threat.  Darius resolves to investigate Greece for a possible 
invasion.  The spies “will discover (mathotes) and see and tell us 
ever detail.”26  Here epistamai evokes a conviction absent from 
other Greek words for knowledge.  Once Darius acts, the Persians 
will have a convinced knowledge of his greatness.  It goes beyond 
the investigatory knowledge of the spies, which Herodotus terms 
mathein. 
 
46 
 
Confident or convinced knowledge also appears in Herodotus at 
6.139.  Pythia tells the Pelasgians to give the Athenians whatever 
they desire.  The request is for the Pelasgian territory.  The 
response is that, when a ship can travel from Athens to Pelasgian 
territory in a single day, with a north wind, we will give you our 
land.  The Pelagians are “well assured” (epistamenoi) that this is 
impossible, since Attica is far to the south of Lemnos.  The 
confidence of the Pelasgians is akin to Macbeth’s, when the 
Apparition tells him why he can be certain to rule.27 
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Aeschylus employs a similar contrast in Prometheus, 375-380.  
Prometheus thinks it would be futile for Oceanus to intervene on 
his behalf with Zeus.  
 
 
 
Prometheus:  You are not inexperienced; you do not 
need teaching from me.  Save yourself as you best 
know how (epistasai).  I will bail the present fortune, 
until the mind-of-bile of Zeus abates (phronema 
lophesei cholou). 
 
 
 
 
Oceanus:  Do you not know (gignoskeis), 
Prometheus, that words are a cure for the passion-
disease?  
 
 
 
Here epistamai suggests a kind of craft knowledge by contrast 
with the theoretical knowledge (gignosko), that words can cure the 
orge sickness.  In principle, logoi (words or arguments, in the 
plural) can cure the “choloric” phronema of Zeus.  In practice, 
Oceanus knows for sure how to survive. 
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Thucydides saw the Athenians as bitter that the sacrilege against 
the Hermae might be part of an oligarchic or tyrannical plot 
against Athens.  Their convinced knowing (epistato) is of the  
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history of oligarchy (6.60.1), and it spurs a contagious fury to find 
the perpetrators of the outrage.  For Thucydides, their convinced 
knowing is tragic, as “many worthy men had already been cast in 
prison; and yet they were not likely so to give over, but grew daily 
more savage, and sought to apprehend more still” (6.60, Hobbes).  
Theirs is the knowing conviction of a mob, ever more savage in 
pursuit of the guilty.  One of those in custody provides an 
accusation, “whether true or not.”  A mood of righteous anger 
pervades the episode.  Accusing fingers point at Alkibiades, and 
the polis sends a trireme to Sicily to retrieve him for trial.  Given 
the mood of Athens, Alkibiades escapes instead.  Sentenced to 
death in absentia, he soon goes to Sparta, where he provides the 
enemy with valuable perspective on the Athenian plans that he had 
been so instrumental in crafting. 
 
49 
 
Syracuse fears that Athens will attack immediately.  When it does 
not, the Syracusans recover their courage and become arrogantly 
contemptuous (katephronesan) in pressing their generals to lead 
them against the Athenian camp at Katana.  The Athenian generals 
see this as an opportunity.  They send a Katanian trusted by 
Syracuse to say that the Athenians spend nights in the city, far 
from their armaments.  If the Syracusans would name a day and 
come at dawn, their allies in the city would close the Athenians 
inside the gates and set fire to their ships. 
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Full of confidence (tharsein), the Syracusan generals believe the 
Katanian uncritically.  As they attack, the Athenians transport 
hoplites by ship to Syracuse, where they land without opposition.  
The Syracusans must scramble back to defend their polis.  The 
next day sees the first battle between Athens and Syracuse.  
Thucydides judged the Syracusans to be courageous but lacking 
experience.  They fight evenly for a long time, but a sudden 
thunderstorm disconcerts and puts them in fear (phobou) 
(6.70.1).  The momentary alarm tips the balance.  Syracuse loses 
260 soldiers; Athens and its allies about 50.  But the Athenian 
generals recognize that war cannot be waged in winter close to 
Syracuse without reinforcement by cavalry from home, so they 
depart for Katana for the winter (6.71). 
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Hermokrates, the leading figure of Syracuse, comes forward to 
encourage the assembly.  “Their courage, he said, was not 
overcome, though their want of order had done them hurt,” as 
Hobbes translated (6.72.3).28  Hermokrates proposes a 
reorganization of the Syracusan force along with arming and 
training the soldiers that winter so they would be better prepared 
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for the Athenians in the spring.  “For valor they had already, and to 
keep their order would be learnt by practice; and both of these 
would still grow greater:  skill, by practicing with danger; and their 
courage (tharsaleoteran) would grow bolder of itself, upon the 
confidence of skill (meta tou pistou tes epistemes)” (6.72.4, 
Hobbes).  Note the interpenetration of courage, confidence, and 
belief with skill, knowledge, and mind.  No strict division of the 
head from the heart or reasoning from confidence and courage 
could come to good terms with meta tou pistou tes epistemes, the 
“confidence of skill.” 
 
 
 
Turning Points: 
Changing Momentum in Sicily  
 
52 
 
The Syracusans determine that the Epipolae, the high ground 
situated directly above their city, is vital to the Athenian attack.  
Killing three hundred Syracusan infantry, the Athenians still win 
the first battle.  Disorder (ataktoteron) again produces Syracusan 
defeat (6.97.4).  The Athenians build a fort at Labdalum, on the far 
side of the Epipolae, away from Syracuse, for storing resources.  
Significant reinforcements from Egestea and Katana now join 
Athens, which begins to build a wall around Syracuse.  Shocked 
(ekplexin) by the rapid progress of the Athenians, Syracusan 
generals cannot order their troops for battle.  They retreat into the 
city, leaving only horsemen to harass the Athenians (6.98.2-3).  As 
work on the wall proceeds, the Syracusans determine that they 
cannot risk further battle, and they decide to build a counter-wall 
instead.  The Athenians attack and destroy it along with the 
underground pipes that carry drinking water into the city (6.100).  
Then the Athenians sail their fleet into the harbor, reuniting their 
forces. 
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Athens has the momentum.  Italy sends provisions.  Sicilians “who 
before stood aloof to observe the way of fortune” join the 
Athenians (6.103.2, Hobbes).  “Meanwhile everything else 
progressed favorably for their hopes.  The Syracusans began to 
despair of finding safety in arms, no relief having reached them 
from the Peloponnesus, and were now proposing terms of 
capitulation among themselves and to Nikias” (6.103.2-3).  The 
Syracusans are aporos, trackless, without a way.  What’s more, 
they divide internally.  “Their present misfortunes had also made 
them suspicious (hupopsian) of one another; and the blame of 
their disasters was thrown upon the ill-fortune or treachery 
(prodosiai, giving up) of the generals under whose command they 
had happened” (6.103.4).  They elect new generals to replace the 
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old. 
 
54 
 
Going to relieve Syracuse, the Spartan general Gylippos hears bad 
news of the battle.  An incorrect report that Athenians have 
completed their wall leads him to abandon hope for Sicily and turn 
to saving Italy.  Crossing to Tarentum, he seeks alliance with 
Thurii.  Bad weather off the southern coast of Italy forces him back 
to Tarentum, where many of his ships must be hauled ashore and 
repaired (6.104.2).  By the summer of 414, therefore, things look 
dark for Syracuse.  Nikias hears of Gylippos’ approach but scorns 
(hupereide) the small number of ships and infers that his only 
purpose with such a small force can be piracy.  Syracuse is on the 
brink of capitulating to Athens. 
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As book 7 opens, however, Gylippos receives more correct – and 
favorable – information from Syracuse.  The Athenian wall is 
incomplete, and Syracuse is not fully besieged.  His army can still 
arrive by the Epipolae and enter the city to defend it.  Sailing to 
Himera, on the north coast of Sicily, he allies with Himerians, 
Selinounians, and others.  Hence he sails for Syracuse with a 
significant force:  700 sailors and armed marines, a thousand 
hoplites and light troops from Himera, and additional forces from 
the other polei (7.1.5).  According to Thucydides, the power of 
Gylippos is his enthusiasm (prothumos).  A Corinthian fleet, 
commanded by Gongylus, reaches Syracuse in the nick of time.  
Gongylus reports to the Syracusans that Gylippos is on his way.  
Reassured, they abandon thoughts of capitulation. 
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This is the first turning point in the Sicilian campaign.  The 
Syracusans gain courage (eperrosthesan) and march to meet 
Gylippos.  He arrives as the Athenians push to complete their wall.  
His sudden approach of Gylippos confuses (ethorubethesan) the 
Athenians at first.  He sends a herald to offer the Athenians five 
days to evacuate.  They disdain the offer – treating it “lightly,” with 
contempt (oligoriai) – and do not bother to respond.  Disorder 
(tarassomenos, to be stirred up, troubled, confounded) among 
Syracusan troops keeps Gylippos from attacking.  Still Nikias’ fatal 
flaw, his inactivity (hesuchaze), leaves the advantage unseized. 
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Once the Syracuse cavalry, under the leadership of Gylippos, does 
come into battle, momentum shifts quickly shifts to the 
Syracusans.  They extend their counter-wall past the Athenian 
wall.  Corinthian and allied ships aid Syracuse, and Gylippos 
brings other Sicilian cities its cause.  He sends back to Sparta and 
Corinth for reinforcements.  Syracuse evens plans to challenge 
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Athenians on the sea, where they had been thought invincible.  In 
short, Syracusans become greatly encouraged (polu eperronto) 
(7.7.4). 
 
 
 Nikias’ Letter to Athens  
 
58 
 
Nikias recognizes that Gylippos and his additional forces are 
putting the Athenians into a grave situation.  Nikias sees the daily 
increase in ischun of his enemy and knows his own aporian 
(7.8.1).  Toward summer’s end in 414, he asks Athens for massive 
reinforcements.  He concedes that Athenians have been forced to 
halt work on their wall and “to remain inactive” (hesuchazomen) 
save to defend it (7.11.3).  The counter-wall must be taken before 
the city can be attacked.  Thus “we who seemed to besiege others 
are besieged ourselves”  (7.11.4, Hobbes). 
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Long at sea, the Athenian fleet is eroding.  Ships are rotting, and 
crews are “wasted.”  The Athenians cannot drag ships ashore for 
drying, because they must stay ready for battle in a hostile region 
where larger numbers of quality ships oppose them.  When not cut 
off by the Syracusan cavalry, they must travel far on land for water, 
fuel, and forage.  Athenian morale declines. Some slaves defect, 
leaving more work for the sailors and soldiers.  Foreign troops are 
“impressed by the unexpected appearance of a navy against us, 
and the strength of the enemy’s resistance” (7.13.2, Crawley).  This 
leads troops pressed into service to depart for their home polei at 
the earliest opportunity.  The resistance of Sicily exceeds their 
expectations.  Initiative passes to the enemy (7.12.5). 
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Given the changed balance of forces, Nikias asks Athens to recall 
the expedition or reinforce it with a contingent equal the one 
already there.  Nikias also asks that he be relieved, because a 
kidney ailment leaves him unfit to command (7.15).  The 
Athenians do not accept his resignation, but they do send 
significant reinforcements led by Demosthenes, architect of the 
Pylos strategy, and Eurymedon.  Just as Nikias had warned when 
debating the expedition, though, Sparta attacks Athens.  As 
Alkibiades advised, moreover, Sparta fortifies Decelea, a mere 13-
14 miles from the Athenian polis.  Athens now faces war on two 
fronts. 
 
 
 
 Syracusan Audacity  
 
61 
 
When Gylippos returns with the forces from other Sicilian cities, 
he calls on Syracuse to prepare for a sea fight.  Gylippos and  
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Hermokrates, his ally among the Syracusan leaders, seek to 
persuade Syracusans that the Athenian navy is not invincible.  
Audacity could break the spirit of the Athenians.  To courageous 
(tolmerous) men such as the Athenians, a courageous attack can 
appear most formidable.  The Athenians strike fear (kataphobousi) 
into their neighbors with bold attacks; now this can be done to 
them.  To attack Athenians at sea would be unexpectedly bold 
(tolmesai aprosdoketos), putting fear into them (ekplagenton).  
The resulting advantage in morale would outweigh whatever 
material damage the Athenians might inflict (7.21.3-4). 
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The battle’s outcome is mixed:  Syracuse loses eleven ships and 
many men in its harbor, as against three ships for Athens.  On 
land, however, the Syracusans take three forts in Plemmyrium, to 
the south of the great harbor, which are vital as warehouses for the 
Athenians.  Syracusans capture large stocks of Athenian goods and 
grain along with equipment for forty triremes.  In the telling of 
Thucydides, this is a significant tactical defeat for Athens.  It loses 
materiel; and with Syracusan ships at the harbor entrances, it 
must fight to provision its troops.  But more important is the shift 
in momentum.  The Athenian forces become terrified (kataplexin) 
and demoralized (athumian) (7.24.3).  In Attica, the fortification 
of Decelea makes a long occupation possible.  Spartan troops 
become “permanently fixed in Attica,” causing great destruction, 
and forcing the Athenians to rely even more on imports.  Worst of 
all, the Athenians are saddled with “two wars at once” (7.27-28). 
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In Sicily, with the tide turning against the Athenians, the other 
cities come one by one to the assistance of Syracuse.  As this 
bandwagon allies additional forces against the Athenians, Syracuse 
plans another land-and-sea attack.  It reinforces the prows of its 
triremes to ram Athenian ships more effectively.  Syracuse controls 
most of the harbor’s shore, so the Athenians are limited in backing 
up (7.36.5).  They are alarmed (ethorubounto) to see Gylippos 
attacking by land and sea simultaneously.  After several days, the 
Syracusans win a minor victory.  With an assured expectation 
(elpida) of superiority at sea and strength on land, they prepare 
further attacks (7.41.4). 
 
 
 
 Demosthenes’ Night Attack  
 
64 
 
At this moment, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrive from Athens 
with 73 ships and almost 5,000 troops, many hoplites.  This 
massive force dismays (kataplexis) the Syracusans, who worry for 
a moment that there might be “no end to their dangers.”  They had 
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expected the fortification of Decelea to draw Athenians away from 
Sicily; instead Athens has reinforced its expedition with a force 
almost equal to the initial invasion.  Athenians regain strength 
(hrome) amidst their troubles (7.42.2).  Demosthenes sees that the 
Nikias’ move to winter in Katana instead of attacking further had 
“allowed the terror of his first arrival to evaporate in contempt” 
(Crawley).  Demosthenes determines to strike immediately.  This 
would win Syracuse with a bold stroke or enable Athens to 
withdraw its entire force with the least waste of lives (7.42.3-5). 
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After failing to besiege the city in daylight, Demosthenes plans a 
night battle, an act of unexpected audacity (adoketou tou 
tolmeatos) (7.43.6).  It is the only night battle of the war.  Initially 
the Athenians succeed, but their advance succumbs to increasing 
disorder.  War chants of Athenian allies resemble those of 
Syracusans, confusing the Athenians, making them aporian.  
According to Thucydides, the situation becomes chaotic and 
terrifying for the Athenians (7.44.4-5).  In the end, they fight not 
only the Syracusans but also many Athenian allies.  “As they fled 
before the enemy, the way of the descent from Epipolae by which 
they were to go back being but strait, many of them threw 
themselves down from the rocks, and died so” (7.44.7-8, Hobbes). 
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The audacious move of Demosthenes ends in defeat.  The 
Syracusans win an important victory.  The unexpected good 
fortune (aprosdoketoi eupragiai) restores their former courage, 
confidence, anarrosthentes (7.46.1).  The disaster (sumphoran) 
leads Demosthenes to advocate immediate withdrawal.  The army 
has failed.  The soldiers are aggrieved, vexed, achthomenous.  
Disease sets in as they camp on marshy ground.  Everything 
appears hopeless (anelpista) (7.47.1-2).  Demosthenes favors an 
active, consolidated defense.  Athenians should abandon the 
Sicilian campaign, return to Athens, and wage a concentrated 
struggle against the Spartan forces ravaging the Attic countryside.  
In short, they should return to the policy of Perikles. 
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Nikias estimates the situation differently.  He acknowledges 
Athenian troubles in Sicily, but he thinks Syracusans stumble too.  
Naval superiority provided by the new ships means that an 
effective blockade could be maintained, and a pro-Athenian faction 
in the city is scheming to betray Syracuse.  It would soon be ruined 
by costs of the blockade.  Furthermore Nikias fears the harsh 
judgment of his own leadership if Athenians return now to Athens 
(7.48-49).  He even opposes Demosthenes’ call to move the land 
forces to more favorable ground.  But Gylippos returns to Syracuse 
 
Glenn Perusek 65 Poroi, 3, 2, December, 2004 
with new reinforcements from other Sicilian cities and more 
hoplites from the Peloponnesus.  Athenian soldiers grow worse 
from illness.  Finally Nikias relents and agrees to leave.  Yet an 
eclipse of the moon concerns the Athenians, who urge their 
generals to hesitate before this divine sign (7.50). 
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Full of energy and confidence, Syracuse again attacks the 
Athenians by land and sea.  When it wins decisively at sea, in the 
harbor, even against the fleet reinforced by Demosthenes, the 
Athenians are athumias, “utterly out of heart” (Hobbes).  Deceived 
(paralogos) by events, they regret (metamelos) the expedition 
(7.55.1).  Already perplexed (eporoun), they have now lost at sea, 
where it was least expected (7.55.2).  Victory elates Syracuse, since 
it has defeated Athenians on the water, where they had been 
thought invincible.  The confidence of Syracuse soars so high that 
it establishes new goals for the engagement.  It now wants to close 
the harbor so that the Athenians cannot escape (7.59.3). 
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Desperate Athenians attempt several times to break out.  But 
“unprecedented and decided defeat at sea” disheartens 
(athumoutas) them (7.60.5).  For Thucydides, Syracuse succeeds 
both because it gains material advantage over the Athenians and 
because the Athenians lose heart.  As Gylippos puts it, “When men 
are once checked in what they consider their special excellence, 
their whole opinion of themselves suffers more than if they had 
not at first believed in their superiority, the unexpected shock to 
their pride causing them to give way more than their real strength 
warrants; and this is probably now the case with the Athenians” 
(7.66.3, Crawley). 
 
 
 
 “The Greatest Reversal”  
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The Athenians fail to escape the harbor.  Their soldiers on land, 
observing the great battle in the harbor, are “prey to the most 
agonizing and conflicting emotions” (7.71.2).  When events at sea 
turn against Athens, its soldiers panic (ekplexis).  Loss of the fleet 
threatens not only their lives and safety but the safety of their 
home polis as well.  In defeat, even the Athenian sailors are so 
utterly overcome (katapelechthai) that they refuse to board their 
ships.  They no longer believe in the possibility of success.  
Defeatism consumes the sailors of the greatest Hellenic sea power 
(7.72.3). 
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The final episode of the tragedy is the attempt by Nikias and 
Demosthenes to lead the Athenians away on land.  All ships lost,  
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all hopes and expectations ( megales elpidos) dashed, the 
Athenians disintegrate.  They leave their dead unburied, a 
sacrilege.  They abandon the sick and seriously wounded.  
“Insomuch as the whole army, filled with tears and irresolute, 
could hardly get away, though the place were hostile and they had 
suffered already, and feared to suffer in the future, more than with 
tears could be expressed; but hung down their heads and generally 
blamed themselves” (7.75.2-4, Hobbes).  Demoralized (aporian), 
disgraced, humiliated, forty thousand Athenians and allies march 
out, soon to surrender.  Comparable to a “starved out polis,” they 
fall to dejection and self-condemnation for their failure.  Nikias, a 
man Thucydides judged “of all the Hellenes in my time, least 
deserv[ing] such a fate,” is killed (7.86.5).  Thousands of Athenians 
become prisoners in quarries, where many perish.  In Sicily, 
Athenians meet with an utter destruction (panolethria). 
 
 
 The Priority of Mood for Strategy  
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Individuals and collectivities are thrown into situations not of their 
own choosing.  To form goals and plans, they assess their 
situations.  They ponder:  How are we doing?  Are we in any 
danger?  Should we feel confident?  Should we feel safe?  As people 
ask and answer, their faculties of reasoning and feeling are fully in 
play.  To make and evaluate plans, people tap moods of 
confidence, fear, fatigue, panic, ambition, and more.  In the world 
of Thucydides, the speakers, deliberators, and doers succeed 
through attunement to moods.  These people recognize moods, 
mobilize them, inform them, contest them, and learn from them.  
Moods color assessments, but precise estimations of their 
character or effect can be difficult.  For most people, moods come 
to clear consciousness only in part, even as they figure 
prominently and appropriately in reasoning.  Rare are the leaders 
who measure acutely the significance of moods for themselves or 
others. 
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Strategic leaders especially should respect communal moods.  
Material assessments of situations must count moods as 
important.  The arrogance, complacency, urgency, or anxiety of a 
group can change events in war, politics, and more.  Otherwise 
superior but demoralized strength seldom prevails.  Strategic 
leaders must counteract collective moods at odds with their 
settings or plans.  Factional infighting or overdone backslapping 
can sap the ability of any group to succeed. 
 
 74  The moods of strategic leaders can affect, even infect, their  
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followers.  Doubt or undue confidence can cripple a group by 
gripping one of its leaders, just as surely as fear or arrogance can 
impede the group by suffusing its ordinary members. 
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Even the vaunted individualism of Americans – and their rational 
choice theories – is more a matter of mood than of biology or 
liberty.  Only when a mood of narrowly selfish self-regard pervades 
a situation does it operate like the economist’s market.  In the 
fractious Greece of Thucydides, that family of moods was not 
unknown, but neither was it predominant. 
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There are implications for methods of social science.  Models of 
rational choice embed assumptions about collective moods.  A 
sense of solidarity dissolves the prisoners’ dilemma.  So gangs, 
movements, and institutions cultivate solidarity.  It is the infection 
of such groups by a mood of individualism that brings the 
possibility of free riding; and any “rational calculation” by 
individuals must involve self-interrogation about confidence, trust, 
and other aspects of mood.  How much confidence do individuals 
have that their confederates will not ride free?  As Thucydides 
suggested, divided and demoralized groups are the ones that can 
be sure that it is every man for himself.  Members in a different 
mood, confident that colleagues or comrades have their backs, act 
less often as individualists. 
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Like political strategies in the tales of Thucydides, rational 
calculations in the mode of Mancur Olson predicate reasoning on 
moods.29  Moods inform rational judgments.  Collective moods are 
thus an element of practical reasoning.  Political language that 
separates reason and realism from moods is at best an artificial 
simplification.  Real strategic actors do – and should – think (in 
part) with their hearts.  Using their heads, successful political 
performers take into account their own hearts and those of others.  
Consider the importance of anger at injustice as a ground for 
rational action, or the significance of dismay as a basis for 
reasoned inaction.  If we dismiss anger, dismay, or other moods as 
legitimate considerations in what we do, we fail a strategic test for 
political success apparent in the narratives of Thucydides. 
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Dramatists often simplify the action.  “Usually some one character 
. . . enjoys the role of primus inter pares.”  This character is the 
“summarizing vessel” of “the development as a whole.”30  In the 
writing of Thucydides, this representative character is Athens.  It is 
managed well by the great statesman, Perikles; but after his death, 
its impetuous action leads to tragedy.  Goaded by violent, 
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vindictive politicians like Kleon, Athens nearly commits in the 
Mytilene case a fatal error of excess.  Even with the good fortune of 
the Pylos episode, Athens fails to make peace.  Again driven by 
advice from Kleon, Athens reaches out for more than it deserves.  
After Kleon dies, a bloodlessly cruel Athens eradicates the island 
population of Melos.  Hubristic passion trumps polis advantage.  
The disaster skirted in Mytilene now comes to a cold conclusion.  
In a spirit of hubris, Athens immediately mounts an extreme 
expedition to dominate its Peloponnesian enemies by seizing 
Syracuse and the rest of Sicily.  During this overextension, 
Alkibiades and Nikias struggle over the soul of Athens.  Neither 
has the stature or skill of Perikles, and each suffers a fatal 
weakness.  Together these produce the Sicilian tragedy. 
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Throughout the account of Thucydides, Athens is like a fine 
gyroscope.  When working effectively, under able leadership, it 
acts within appropriate limits and attains success through its 
distinctive excellence:  the fleet.  After Perikles, no leaders keep 
Athens within its compass.  After Kleon and Alkibiades drive it 
into trouble, Diodotos and Demosthenes revive the Periklean 
legacy, but only momentarily.  Nikias fails to persuade the 
assembly to hold back; and when in Sicily, his inactivity furthers 
the decline of Athens. 
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In the telling of Thucydides, this tragedy involves many moods for 
Athens.  Perikles must revive spirits when invasion and plague 
costs Athenians confidence after only two years of war.  Diodotus 
must dampen their viciousness in Mytilene case.  After Pylos, 
Kleon manipulates Athenian pleonekteÿ.  In facing Melos, the 
mood of Athenians is calculating and brutal.  In turning to Sicily, it 
becomes passionate grasping.  The overall trajectory of Athens is 
toward excess.  For Thucydides, the figure who personifies this 
mood is Alkibiades, the brilliant rhetor and general who lives 
beyond his own means and whose excesses seduce the polis.  
Where Perikles stands incorruptibly above suspicion, Alkibiades 
lurks in shadows and proves quick to betray Athens.  Where 
Perikles puts the polis before personal benefit, Alkibiades 
subordinates Athens to his own gain and glory.  When Athens no 
longer serves these selfish desires, Alkibiades quickly abandons it 
for the enemy.  Already the damage has been done, though, with 
Athens already seduced into dangerous overextension.31 
 
 
 
 
 
© Glenn Perusek, 2004.  
Glenn Perusek 69 Poroi, 3, 2, December, 2004 
 
 
 Notes  
 
 
 
1     As J. de Romilly writes in Thucydide et l’impérialisme athénien 
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